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Homomorphic encryption allows computation on encrypted data and may protect privacy in cloud
computing. Is homomorphic encryption ready for deployment? This paper is an attempt to answer
the question.
As cloud computing is being adopted, protecting “outsourced” data becomes an essential issue. Several
incidents highlight this concern. In May 2009, unintended sharing occurred on a site providing on-line office
applications [7]. In October 2010, some applications in a social network violated the privacy policy [6]. As
more personal (such as healthcare and tax report) and confidential (such as sales records) data are stored
on-line, protecting privacy becomes an increasingly important topic. Many studies have been conducted
to protect outsourced data. Among all solutions, homomorphic encryption [3] is a promising approach and
Micciancio calls it the “Holy Grail” in Cryptography [5]. Homomorphic encryption [1] allows operations on
encrypted data; thus, cloud servers may use encrypted data without access to the original data. Figure 1
shows the general framework. Homomorphic encryption is considered too expensive and remains an academic
curiosity. This paper intends to shed some more light for understanding whether homomorphic encryption
is ready for deployment and what directions should be pursued to make it practical.
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Figure 1: A general framework for using cloud service with data protection. Data are encrypted before being
sent to the cloud server. The server performs computation on the encrypted data. The results are obtained
by decrypting the data from the server. The solid lines represent the data owner; the dashed line means the
server is not trusted.
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Figure 2(a) and (b) illustrate the concept of homomorphic encryption. Suppose x =< x1 , x2 , . . . , xn >
is a sequence of n elements as the original unprotected data, also called plaintext. An operation f can
be performed on x to obtain result r = f (x) =< r1 , r2 , . . . , rm >. Let y =< y1 , y2 , . . . , yn > be the
corresponding ciphertext; y =< e(x1 ), e(x2 ), . . . , e(xn ) > and e is the encryption operation. We can obtain
x through decryption x = d(y). We call the encryption and the operation homomorphic if d(f (y)) = r.
In other words, the same operation can be applied to encrypted data and the result can be obtained after
decryption, as illustrated in Figure 2(b). Homomorphic encryption is not another encryption algorithm (like
AES or RSA). Instead, it is a property of some encryption algorithms; some encryption algorithms cannot
be homomorphic, for example, if they are non-malleable [1]. The encryption algorithm illustrated in Figure 2
(b) is deterministic: for a plaintext x, a unique ciphertext y is created. Many encryption algorithms are
non-deterministic: a plaintext x may be mapped to one of many possible ciphertexts. Non-deterministic
encryption can provide better protection because it is difficult to know whether two different y’s correspond
to the same x. This is illustrated in Figure 2 (c). The sidebar Example of Homomorphic Encryption using
Non-Deterministic Encryption gives a numeric example. The sidebar also shows an example when h(x) = x3
produces a wrong result for x =< x1 >=< 2 >, illustrated by point a in Figure 2(d).
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Figure 2: Overview of homomorphic encryption. (a) Operation f is performed on unprotected data x and
produces result r = f (x). (b) Homomorphic encryption means y = e(x) and d(f (y)) = d(f (e(x))) = r.
(c) Non-deterministic encryption maps one plaintext x to one of many possible ciphertexts. The circle is
called decryption radius [4]. (d) In some cases, f (y) may fall outside the decryption radius; thus, d(f (y)) is
incorrect because it is different from f (x).
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The concept of homomorphic encryption was first proposed by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos in 1978.
For three decades, only a few operations (most noticeably addition and multiplication) are found homomorphic. The main problem is the introduction and accumulation of “noise” during computation performed on
encrypted data. When the noise exceeds an acceptable range (called decryption radius), the decrypted result
d(f (y)) is no longer correct. In 2009, Gentry proves that it is possible to construct a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme for any operations [2, 3] by denoising frequently. The sidebar Denoise Procedure describes
Gentry’s scheme. Even though it is theoretically possible to perform any operation on encrypted data, it
is generally believed that the overhead is too high. A recent paper [4] provides a quantitative study about
the overhead of denoising elementary symmetric polynomials of encrypted bits using Gentry’s algorithm.
Our paper provides additional information about the overhead for performing arithmetic and relational operations. These operations form the foundation for future studies on computation using encrypted data.
We create a library for these operations using the symmetric encryption scheme and denoising algorithm
described in [3]. This paper quantitatively analyzes how execution time is affected by the types of operations,
key sizes, data sizes, and the numbers of denoising.
The overhead of homomorphic encryption comes from four sources. (1) Encryption and decryption. (2) A
small integer (for example, 32 or fewer bits) can become very large after encryption, depending on the size of
the key. (3) Substantial overhead is introduced when arithmetic operations are implemented by software for
encrypted data. (4) Denoising needs to be performed frequently to ensure the correctness of the intermediate
and final results. The overhead of (1) and (2) has been widely studied. This paper focuses on (3) and (4).
We create a library for basic arithmetic and relational operations including “+e ”, “−e ”, “×e ”, “/e ”,
“<e ”, and “==e ” on encrypted integers. The library is written in C++ with GNU Multiple Precision
Arithmetic Library (GMP) 5.0.1 for handling large numbers. Our program runs on a server with 4 Intel
Xeon L7555 1.87GHz processors and 128 GB memory. The GMP library and our program are compiled
using the gcc version 4.1.2 with flag -O2 -m64. Neither our program nor the GMP library is parallelized.
We use gettimeofday to measure the execution time taken by an operation.
Our implementation use the following steps. (1) A plaintext integer is first converted into the binary
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representation. (2) Each bit is encrypted and then becomes a “big integer”, i.e. an mpz t object in the GMP
library. (3) The arithmetic operations are performed based on bit-wise operations using the algorithms
described in [8]. The “<e ” relational operation is implemented by subtracting the two operands and then
taking the MSB of the result. The “==e ” operation is implemented by subtracting two operands. If the
two operands are equal, their difference is zero and every bit is zero. We detect whether every bit is zero
by flipping each bit and multiplying them. If the result is one, the two numbers are equal; otherwise, the
two numbers are different. These operations are implemented using the GMP library, such as mpz add and
mpz mul on the encrypted bits. (4) Our method denoises the intermediate results if the accumulated noise
exceeds a threshold. The procedure for determining the threshold is beyond the scope of this paper. We use
mpf mul from the GMP library to handle multiplication of floating-point numbers for denoising. (5) The
ciphertexts are decrypted to get the final results. Figure 3 shows the example of implementing addition on
two encrypted integers. The plaintexts are 3 and 2; each one is encrypted to three big integers (mpz t). A
full adder takes three big integers as the inputs and generates the sum and the carry; both are encrypted as
mpz t objects. The first full adder takes a plaintext 0 as the input carry. The last full adder discards the
output carry. The four mpz t objects corresponding to the sum bits are decrypted and the final result is 5.
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Figure 3: An example of implementing addition on two encrypted integers, 3 and 2. Each bit is encrypted to
an mpz t object. Both the input and output of a full adder are mpz t objects. The shaded region represents
the +e operation.
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key size

generate key

encrypt

decrypt

mpz add

mpz mul

mpf mul

denoise

1024 bits

12.35

8.39 ×10−3

7.64 ×10−4

4.97×10−5

7.72×10−4

0.45

774.3

2048 bits

43.86

9.46 ×10−3

9.16 ×10−4

6.73×10−5

2.02×10−3

2.43

3120.5

4096 bits

169.34

1.07 ×10−2

1.25 ×10−3

1.01×10−4

5.73×10−3

10.42

12384.1

8192 bits

594.36

1.21 ×10−2

1.82 ×10−3

1.67×10−4

1.65×10−2

53.13

53712.8

Table 1: Execution time for different operations on a single bit (unit: milliseconds).
Table 1 shows the time taken by different steps for operations on one bit with different key sizes. Key
generation needs to be performed only once and the same key can be reused. The “encrypt” and “decrypt”
columns show the time to encrypt and decrypt one bit. The “mpz add” and “mpz mul” columns show the
time to perform an addition and a multiplication on two encrypted bits. The “mpf mul” shows the time
to perform the multiplication on one floating point number with one encrypted bit for denoising. The last
column in this table shows the time to denoise once, using |A| = 1024 and |B| = 15 defined in the sidebar
Denoise Procedure. As can be seen in this table, denoising takes much longer than the other operations. In
actual computation, denoising may need to be performed multiple times for intermediate values.
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Figure 4: The time need to perform relational and arithmetic operations for different key sizes. Addition,
subtraction, and less than are much faster because they do not require denoising. The plaintexts are two
8-bit integers.
Figure 4 shows the execution time to perform the six operations on two 8-bit integers with different key
sizes. Three operations: “<e ”, “+e ” and, “−e ”, are significantly faster because they do not need denoising.
They take approximately 14.5 milliseconds for a key of 1024 bits and 675.0 milliseconds for a key of 8192
bits. The other operations require denoising and thus take longer time. For each operation, as the key size
increases, the number of denoises decreases but the time for running one denoise increases. The “==e ”
operation needs denoising twice when the key size is 1024 bits and the execution time is 1.5 seconds. It
does not use any denoise when the key size increases to 2048 bits and the execution time decreases to only
46.5 milliseconds. When the key size increases to 4096 bits and 8192 bits, it still does not need denoise; the
execution time increases to 182.0 milliseconds and 691.2 milliseconds due to the longer keys. The “×e ” and
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“/e ” use more denoises, thus they take much longer time. The “×e ” operation uses from 70 to 17 denoises
as the key size increases, and the time increases from 53.9 seconds to 962.3 seconds (16.0 minutes). The
“/e ” operation uses from 415 to 117 denoises; its execution time increases from 323.4 seconds (5.4 minutes)
to 6360.3 seconds (1.8 hours).
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Figure 5: The time for performing six operations with different data size for the plaintexts. The encryption
uses a key of 1024 bits.
Figure 5 shows the execution time to perform the six operations when the plaintexts increase from 8
to 15 bits. The encryption uses a key of 1024 bits. We do not consider data with more than 15 bits,
because multiplication may produce the results exceeding a 32-bit integer. The execution time increases
with data size because more bits are needed, more bit-wise operations are performed, and more denoises
are used. When the plaintext data has 8 bits, the “<e ” and “−e ” do not need any denoise and take 14.1
milliseconds. They start to use denoise when data has 9 bits; one denoise is used and the execution time
is 771.8 milliseconds. The number of denoises in “<e ” and “−e ” gradually increase to 7 when data has
15 bits, and the time increases to 5.2 seconds. When data size is 8-bit, “×e ” and “/e ” use 70 and 415
denoises, and take 55.7 seconds and 328.9 seconds (5.5 minutes). As data size increases to 15-bit, they use
350 and 1654 denoises, and take 278.5 seconds (4.6 minutes) and 1312.7 seconds (21.9 minutes). As shown
in the figure, “+e ” takes the shortest time. The execution times of “<e ” and “−e ” are close, because their
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bit-wise operations are almost the same except the last step in “<e ”, taking the MSB of the results, which
does not introduce any noise. The “<e ” and “−e ” take longer time than “+e ” because they perform extra
two’s-complement operations before using the “+e ” operation. The “==e ” first subtracts two operands and
then multiply each bit of the result, therefore it takes more time than the “−e ” operation.
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Figure 6: The time for computation with multiple operations.
We also consider computation with multiple operations: (i) ((3 × 3) × (3 × 3)) × 3 = 243, (ii) (13 ×
(16 − 4)) × ((−21/7)) + 20)/9) = 156, and (iii) ((13 + 16)2 × (4 − 21)3 ) × (21/5 + 20/(−9))2 = −16527332;
they are all performed on encrypted data. Each plaintext integer uses as few bits as necessary and a sign
bit is added as the MSB, for example, 13 uses five bits as 01101. Figure 6 shows the execution time of the
three cases above with the key size increasing from 1024 bits to 8192 bits. The time rises for (i) from 85.2
seconds (1.4 minutes) to 1406.4 seconds (23.4 minutes) as the key size increases; denoising is performed from
100 to 26 times. For (ii), the execution time rises from 555.1 seconds (9.3 minutes) to 11028.1 seconds (3.1
hours); denoising is performed 703 to 205 times. For (iii), the execution time rises from 2466.7 seconds (41.1
minutes) to 69509.1 seconds (19.3 hours); denoising is performed from 3157 to 1261 times. Our evaluation
shows that the overhead is mostly from denoising, which accounts for more than 99% of the total execution
time in these cases. It can also be shown that as the key size increases, even though fewer denoises are
required, each takes longer time and the total execution time is longer.
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Even though computation on encrypted data is several orders of magnitude slower, we remain
optimistic about the future of homomorphic encryption.

Computation on encrypted data is several orders of magnitude slower than computation on unprotected
data. Hence, it is unlikely that cloud vendors would be able to offer services on encrypted data within a few
years. However, we remain optimistic about the future of homomorphic encryption for the following reasons.
(1) This paper presents upper bounds of the overhead because future studies can improve upon our current
implementation. (2) Our implementation uses software in every step, from encryption to computation,
from denoising to decryption. Some steps may use hardware accelerators, special-purpose co-processors or
new instructions in future processors. Also, our implementation does not take advantage of multiple cores,
available in most processors now. (3) We are confident that many efficient denoising algorithms will be
developed in the next few years because protecting data is essential for cloud computing. (4) Research on
homomorphic encryption is still at an early stage. Some government agencies have allocated funds to support
this research; for example, in July 2010 US DARPA announced PROCEED (PROgramming Computation
on EncryptEd Data). (5) It is possible to dramatically reduce the execution time if some operations do not
need protection. For example, the average of two numbers (a + b)/2 can be performed on encrypted values
for a and b but division by 2 may not need protection. In our implementation, this can be implemented
by discarding the LSB and no noise is introduced. In this case, the cloud server knows division by two has
been performed but the server does not know the values of a or b, nor their sum. (6) Many applications, for
example, searching images or videos, do not require 100% accuracy. Existing search algorithms are imperfect
even on unprotected data. It may be acceptable to lose a few more percentages of accuracy in exchange for
better performance and protection of privacy.
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Example of Homomorphic Encryption using Non-Deterministic Encryption
Let p and q be two prime numbers and n = pq. The encryption function e() is defined as [9]
yi = e(xi ) = (xi + pri ) mod n,
here xi is an integer smaller than p and ri is an integer, chosen by the data owner. In this encryption, p
and q are the keys and must be protected. The decryption function d() is
xi = d(yi ) = yi mod n.
In real applications, p and q can be very large (hundreds or thousands of bits). In this example, we choose
p = 7 and q = 5, n = 35. Let x =< x1 , x2 >=< 2, 1 > as the plaintexts. If we use 4 and 6 for r respectively
in y1 and y2 , we can obtain
y1 = (2 + 4 × 7) mod 35 = 30
y2 = (1 + 6 × 7) mod 35 = 8.
Suppose the operation f is addition, i.e. f (x) = x1 + x2 . We can obtain r = 2 + 1 = 3. If f uses the
encrypted data, we can obtain f (y) = y1 + y2 = 30 + 8 = 38. Decrypting 38 and we can get
38 mod 7 = 3.
This is the same as r. Another example is multiplication. g(x) = x1 × x2 = 2 × 1 = 2. If multiplication is
performed on y1 and y2 , we can obtain
30 × 8 = 240 and 240 mod 7 = 2.
This is the same as x1 × x2 .
Unfortunately, sometimes we may obtain incorrect results. Suppose h(x) = x1 3 = 23 = 8. However,
h(y) = 303 = 27000 and 27000 mod 7 = 1; this is different from 8. This is an example when the result
falls out of the decryption radius. Intuitively, d(h(y)) 6= h(x) when r ≥ p; the relation is actually more
complex.
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Denoise Procedure
Gentry presents a symmetric encryption scheme and the denoise procedure [3]. The encryption scheme
uses an odd integer p as the key. Let mi ∈ {0, 1} be a one-bit plaintext. The corresponding ciphertext is
ci = pqi + 2ri + mi , where qi and ri are integers chosen by the owner. Decryption is d(ci ) = (ci mod p)
mod 2, here ci mod p is the distance to the nearest multiple of p. This is also the noise associated to ci .
Decryption works only when the noise is less than p.
Each plaintext integer is first converted to its binary representation and arithmetic operations are performed
on the bits. For example, a full adder has three input bits m1 , m2 and m3 and produces two output bits:
MSB = (m1 m2 + m1 m3 + m2 m3 ) mod 2 and LSB = (m1 + m2 + m3 ) mod 2. After encryption of each
input bit, the bit-wise operations are translated to additions or multiplications on the ciphertexts, i.e.
e(MSB) = (c1 c2 + c1 c3 + c2 c3 ) and e(LSB) = (c1 + c2 + c3 ). This encryption is homomorphic because we
can add or multiply (modulo 2) the bits by simply adding or multiplying their ciphertexts.
Decryption d(ci ) = (c mod p) mod 2 is equivalent to LSB(c) XOR (bc/pc), where LSB takes the least
significant bit and b.c is the floor function. Getting LSB and computing XOR are easy; computing c/p is
complicate and produces substantial amounts of noise. A = {1, 2, . . . , α} and B are two sets of integers.
B is a proper subset of A: B ⊂ A, B 6= A. Suppose β = |B|. Since B is a proper subset of A, α > β.
S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sα } is an indicator set: si = 1, if i ∈ B, otherwise si = 0. Another set T =< t1 , t2 , . . . , tα >
is created such that

P
i∈B

ti = 1/p. Thus

α
P

si ti = 1/p. Each element in S is encrypted. Both S and T

i=1

are sent to the cloud server for denoising. During denoising, the server computes Z = {z1 , z2 , . . . , zα }
with zi = cyi mod 2 (i = 1, 2, . . . , α) by taking dlog2 (β)e + 1 bits after the binary point for each zi . The
denoised ciphertext is LSB (c) XOR LSB(b

α
P

si zi e). This is still encrypted but the ciphertext is pushed

i=1

toward the center of the decryption radius. The server can detect the values of α and β. However, si is
encrypted so the server does not know which elements in T are actually used. Brute force attacks require
testing

α!
β!(α−β)!

possible cases. This is computationally infeasible if α  β  1.
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